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Contribution
to debate
CAN WE ARGUE FOR A HUMAN RIGHT TO BASIC
INCOME?
José
Luis Rey Pérez
Researcher.
Universidad Pontificia Comillas of Madrid.
Spain.
ABSTRACT
Is it possible to argue for a human right to basic income?
For that purpose we have to look for good fundamentals for
this new right. Here I will examine the connections between
basic income and two concepts of basic needs as a way to
support a human right to basic income. These two concepts
of needs are moral concepts. Firstly, I will study the connection
between basic income and primary needs. Secondly, the connection
between basic income and radical needs. At the end we can
conclude that basic income is not itself a right. It is
a guarantee (a good guarantee, and perhaps the best one)
to the right to subsistence and to the right to develop
different lifestyles.
CAN
WE ARGUE FOR A HUMAN RIGHT TO BASIC INCOME?
In
this paper I will try to examine the relations between basic
income and basic needs trying to see if this is a good way
to argue basic income as a human right.
1.
The concept of basic income.
As
all we know basic income is a income paid by the government
to each adult member of the society irrespective of whether
the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others,
is willing to work or not; in addition, basic income is
granted not only to citizens but also to all permanent residents
(Van Parijs, 1992; 1995; 2001, among others). This is the
definition of the so-called basic income, which is supported
by Professor Van Parijs in his book Real freedom for all.
The
idea is, in one side, very attractive. But, in the other
side, it is surprising. It is attractive because consists
on a radical reform of the assistance systems that we know
in the Welfare State. This assistance was always conditioned
to fulfil a lot of requirements; it was not universal. But
it is also surprising in a current context of economical
crisis and control of the budget.
If
we look for the origin of the proposal we find that it was
born in the context of a Marxist discussion. In the article
"A capitalist road to communism", Van Parijs and
Van der Veen (Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 1986) upheld
that a universal and unconditioned basic income was a good
way to arrive to communism without passing through socialism.
The purpose of socialism consists on the elimination of
the exploitation, but the purpose of communism is to eliminate
the alienation. If the government provides with an income
(which quantity must be enough to cover basic needs) to
everybody, then people are free to work or not to work.
If they decide to work it would be because other reason
different from the necessity to eat every day. Or, in other
words, people would not be alienated. This proposal received
a lot of critics and a lot of supports too, and was the
seed of an interesting political debate.
2.
Look for fundamentals
But
the end of communism compelled Van Parijs to look for another
support to basic income. In fact, I think there are two
ways for argue in favour of the basic income. In one side,
there are those arguments that connect basic income with
a theory of Justice. In the other side, there are those
arguments that compare the basic income with other type
of programs; the criterion in this case is the economical
efficiency. But if we want to argue basic income as a fundamental
right we have to follow the first way. The decision about
if we are in front of a new human right doesn't depend on
economical efficiency.
In
Real freedom for all (Van Parijs, 1995) he tries
to demonstrate the necessity of a basic income for what
he calls a fair society. As we know, Van Parijs thinks that
we are in a fair State only if the real freedom is protected.
Real freedom is the freedom of people to do anything a person
may want to do, not only what now he wants to do but also
what they might want to do. The theory of Justice argued
by Van Parijs is a liberal theory. The government can't
promote any idea about what is the good life. The State
is justified only if it defends the real freedom of the
citizens. With this purpose, there are three principles
that order the society: the security, the ownership of oneself
and the order of opportunities in favour of people with
disadvantages. These principles go with their own institutions.
The security raises a body of guaranteed rights. The ownership
of oneself origins the right to own autonomy. And the third
principle generates the basic income. In fact, a society
without this new institution is radically liberal, but not
egalitarian liberal. Only if the State provides with a universal
basic income we can argue that we are in a society which
members are really free.
From my point of view, Van Parijs proves that basic income
is enough to protect real freedom of citizens, but he can't
prove that the basic income is necessary to this purpose.
If we try to argue for a new human right we must prove that
it is necessary. If we argue about sufficiency we have to
compare the different options from the economical efficiency
analysis. But if we talk about human rights we have to demonstrate
that they are necessary to Justice.
In
this point I would like to investigate another way to argue
basic income as a human right. This is the relationship
between basic needs and basic income. Basic needs are the
anthropological support for human rights, so this is a good
way to look for the fundamentals for a right to basic income.
In his first articles about basic income Van Parijs said
that it must be enough to cover basic needs (Van der Veen
and Van Parijs, 1986). But in Real freedom for all
(Van Parijs, 1995) he says that there is nothing in the
concept of basic income that connects this institution with
basic needs. Basic income can be less or more than the level
of basic needs, although he recognises that the level of
basic income must be "sufficient for subsistence"
(Van Parijs, 2001; Barry, 2001). Despite, there are a lot
of authors who find some connection between these two concepts.
For example, the Basic Income Spanish Network defines basic
income as a reasonable income but enough to cover basic
needs, paid to each member of society (citizens or residents)
as a right financed by taxes or by another ways (www.redrentabasica.org;
Raventós, 2001). In this definition we can see the
connection between basic needs and rights. Because one tradition
of philosophy of Human Rights support the idea that social
rights are ways to satisfy needs that we take away from
the market. This is the reason because I think it is possible
connecting basic needs and basic income, because if this
is a social right there must be a link between them.
3.
Concepts of basic needs.
When
we talk about basic needs we can mean different things.
In fact, there are a lot of catalogues about what the human
basic needs are. In this paper I will use only two concepts
of basic needs.
Probably
when we talk about basic needs immediately we think in those
natural needs as eating, drinking, sleeping. These needs
concern to natural world and in my opinion they don't contribute
to the political discussion. But this natural concept -which
belongs to the world of to be- can be reformulated in a
moral concept that belongs to the world of duties. We can
do this if we reformulate basic needs in accordance to the
liberal moral ideal, that is, the development of moral autonomy,
the development of moral agents liberty in the decisions
about what they want to do in their life. Then, we can understand
basic needs as the previous conditions for the moral autonomy,
as those facts without them the moral election is not possible.
These requirements are the same for all the agents, but
they are present in different measures. If we satisfy these
needs (that we can call it "primary needs") all
the moral agents would be in the same original point. Only
from that point, we can talk about moral autonomy; only
if we satisfy these needs, agents are autonomous. I think
this is the concept of basic needs that support Nino (Nino,
1990) and, in different sense, Doyal and Gough, although
Nino doesn't offer a catalogue, and Doyal and Gough do it;
however, all the needs they argue for, are conditions without
them the moral autonomy doesn't exist: food and drinking
water, lodging, work and environment without dangers, health,
physical security, security for children, economical security
and education (Doyal and Gough, 1986).
This concept, as we can see, is wider than natural needs.
Primary needs include natural ones, but also other needs
as cognitive and intellectual faculties, basic education,
and ownership to a moral and to a historical community.
Only when we satisfy these needs we can say the agents are
autonomous.
But
we can understand other thing when we talk about basic needs.
We can say that these needs are those ones that are originated
by the moral elections of the agents. When people decide
what type of life they wish, then they feel some needs;
those are basic needs. Those are the radical needs that
Agnes Heller (Heller, 1996) talked about. Heller thinks
that all needs are real and they all must be recognised.
Consequently, we cannot talk about the same needs for everybody,
because needs depend on the lifestyle of each person.
Obviously,
there is a limit that derives from the own idea of moral
autonomy. All human need must be recognised if it doesn't
go against the imperative that compels to treat men and
women always as an aim and not as simple instruments. Kant´s
imperative is the criterion to distinguish between good
and bad needs, between those that must be satisfied and
those that must not. As we can see, the concept of basic
needs that exposes Heller is a ethical one. It is derived
from the liberal idea according to it each person must decide
her own lifestyle.
In addition, the concept of radical needs is very significant
to theory of human rights. If we consider that needs are
the anthropological support for human rights, then, if we
recognize radical needs, we are not putting in order the
different groups of rights. We are not saying that the first
rights that we must recognize and protect are the liberal
and political ones (as some types of liberalism do) and
only, in second place, the social and economical ones. If
we agree with the concept of radical needs, then we think
that all rights (civil, political, economical, social, cultural
and other new as ecological) are in the same level and all
must be satisfied. As we know, this is not the only argument
to defend that social rights are, in fact, rights. There
are another reasons that come from basic needs analysis
(see, for example, the paper presented by Plant at last
meeting of BIEN, 2002). Because the argument for primary
needs involves social rights, too. But here the matter is
about order. If we assume radical needs we are defending
that it mustn't exist a previous order in satisfying human
rights. And, in my opinion, this idea is interesting, although
perhaps I think something different.
Because, obviously, the problem of scarcity compel us to
decide satisfying some rights firstly. But, as Agnes Heller
writes, that order doesn't depend on the concept or on the
category of rights, but the democratic consensus about which
type of needs are preferred to other needs that are equally
recognized (Heller, 1987; see, in this sense, Habermas,
1992).
As
a consequence, we have two concepts of basic needs. In one
side, we can understand them as the conditions for the moral
autonomy. In the other side, we can understand them as the
deficiencies originated by the moral election. From my point
of view, between these two concepts we can discover a logic
priority. We can satisfy radical needs only when primary
needs have been satisfied, because these ones make possible
the moral election. Maybe Agnes Heller wouldn't agree with
me, but radical needs are, in my opinion, a secondary type
of needs that only appears when the conditions for moral
autonomy are satisfied.
4.
Connections between basic income and basic needs.
Which
connections can we discover between basic income and these
two concepts of basic needs? Firstly, if we understand basic
income as Van Parijs does, that is, as a institution that
makes possible the real freedom, then we would choose a
concept of need near to the idea of real freedom. And these
are radical needs, because these are needs derived from
the moral election about lifestyle. These needs are different;
they depend on each man or woman's plan of life. Basic income
looks a good way to satisfy radical needs. People would
receive an income and they would decide the use of that
money in accordance with their lifestyle.
This
idea is near to equality of welfare. The purpose is that
all agents achieve the same welfare. But, as Dworkin wrote,
equality of welfare depends on subjective preferences, giving
more resources to people with expensive tastes and punishing
the adaptative preferences (Dworkin, 1981a); 2000). Basic
income solves this problems providing with the same income
to everybody.
If
we study the relationship between basic income and primary
needs, basic income would be a income paid by the governments
in order that all members of society could achieve moral
autonomy. But all the moral agents have not the same needs.
There are people who are more far than others from moral
autonomy. And, in theory, in accordance to the idea of equality
of opportunities, the State must give different quantities
of resources. People who were more far from moral autonomy
would receive more resources (Dworkin, 1981 b); 2000). But
basic income gives the same quantity of money to everybody.
For this reason I think basic income is not a institution
of equality of opportunities.
From my point of view, the basic income is in the middle
of equality of opportunities and equality of welfare. The
basic income has the same purpose as the equality of welfare:
makes the welfare of the agents equal. And it has the same
method as the equality of opportunities: it distributes
resources (that, in case of basic income, is money or, as
other authors defend, the resource is work or jobs).
5.
Is there a human right to basic income?
We
have studied the connection between these two concepts of
basic needs and basic income. Now we have to investigate
if we can derive from this connection a fundamental right
to basic income. I talk about fundamental rights. Now it
is possible that the government of a country decide to pay
a basic income for the year 2004 to all citizens. But if
this government decide to eliminate basic income for the
year 2005, we can't object anything. But if basic income
is a human right recognised, for example, in the Constitution,
the government couldn't eliminate it.
The basic needs, as a way to argue for new human rights,
have been explored by many authors. In Spain, Professor
María José Añón has studied
this deeply. She understands them as the situation of dependence
that suffers a person and which is unavoidable, because
the only option to avoid the damage is satisfying that need.
Añón thinks that this unavoidable character
supports the reasons to satisfy these needs. Then, deciding
to satisfy a need depends on moral argumentation. We have
to find good and strong arguments to justify that a need
must be satisfied. But this is not enough to constitute
a basic need in a right. It is necessary that we can argue
that there is some obligation for somebody to satisfy that
need; when we talk about rights, at the same time, we are
talking about duties. For this reason, Añón
explains that the reasons that transform needs in rights
are three: firstly, there is not any alternative, present
or future, to that need but its satisfaction. This must
be studied from realistic positions, that is, we must do
rational evaluations. Secondly, it is necessary that the
moral agent who suffers the need couldn't satisfy it by
herself. Lastly, it is necessary that ways of satisfactions
could be articulated in effective rules (Añón,
1994).
Following
this reasoning, can we conclude that we can derive a right
to basic income from its connection to basic needs? I am
going to study the two relationships we are talking about.
If we talk about primary needs, we are talking about a need
that, if it is not satisfied, the moral agents would probably
die or, at least, they couldn't be autonomous. This means
that if we do not satisfy primary needs we are using people
as instruments. In addition, we can articulate this needs
in effective rules. In consequence, we can argue for a right
to subsistence. Künnemann talks about a right to food
that it is closely connected with this, although from my
point of view the object of the right to subsistence is
wider; it includes not only food but also host, health and
education among others (Künnemann, 2002). And the basic
income is a way to guarantee this right. The object of the
right is not basic income but the subsistence. Basic income
is a way among others, because we can guarantee this right
with other type of institutions, with conditioned subsidies
or other mechanisms.
If
we talk about radical needs, we conclude something similar.
Behind radical needs we can find the right to autonomy and
dignity, in other words, the right of each person to develop
his or her own lifestyle. But the object of this right is
not the basic income; basic income is only a possible way
to satisfy it. The object of the right is the development
of different lifestyles. In this sense, Standing talks about
a right to security that includes a right to income security
(Standing, 2002a) and 2002b)). I think that, more or less,
both are the same. The object of these rights is real freedom
to develop one's lifestyle. For this reason we need income
security among other things.
In
this point I think it is interesting remembering the distinction
between rights and guarantees that explains Professor Luigi
Ferrajoli. As Italian Professor explains, the law can recognise
some rights but not its guarantees (Ferrajoli, 1989; 1999;
2000; 2001). I am conscious that this distinction is ambiguous.
However, I think we must not confuse the object of a right
with its ways of satisfaction. In fact, a right can be satisfied
in different ways, and when I talk about guaranties I am
talking about that, about different ways of satisfying rights.
These ways are related to the different institutions through
the rights are effective. For example, I don't think citizens
have a right to police; better, we have a right to security.
If we imagine a different institution which guarantee our
security too, the right wouldn't be attack if we wouldn't
have police. Only when the generalised guarantee to the
right to security is police, we can say in metaphorical
sense that we have "a right to police"; but only
in metaphorical sense, because the object of the right is
not the police but the security.
In
this sense, Ferrajoli distinguishes between primary and
secondary guarantees. The first ones are the limits, that
is, the formal and substantial duties imposed to power to
make real and effective the content of a right. The secondary
ones, only appears when the first ones are unfulfilled and
consist on the activity of judges and Courts after the infringements
of rights (Ferrajoli, 1999; 2000; 2001).
Civil and political rights have had universal guarantees.
But the problem started with social, economic and cultural
rights. These rights haven't got universal guarantees. In
fact, their observance has depended on the political will.
In this sense, the observance to these rights has been a
subject of administrative law and not of human rights law.
We
have three alternatives for guarantee social rights. First
one, we can defend that social rights are not rights; they
are only social politics that depend on the colour of the
government (Zolo, 2001). Other solution is establishing
conditional programs that depend on the grade of need. This
is a no universal way to guarantee social rights and we
all know that these systems have had a lot of problems.
Thirdly, as Ferrajoli thinks, it is possible a universal
guarantee (in the same way individual rights are guaranteed)
to these rights. This guarantee would be independent from
any resources test or specific situations. This guarantee
is, in fact, basic income.
But
if we consider basic income as guarantee, then we have to
study it from efficiency perspective. We have to compare
basic income with other possible guarantees and discover
which one is better. We have to study the consequences of
different social policies, as many scholars do in their
researches about basic income.
In
my opinion, this conclusion does not close the opportunity
to include basic income in the Constitution. In fact, if
we demonstrate that basic income is the best guarantee,
we must include it into Constitutions. Meanwhile, talking
about a right to basic income without any other arguments,
it can imply taking rights not enough seriously. And today,
with the events we are living, I think people who are worried
about human rights, must take rights seriously, and guarantees
very seriously.
José Luis Rey Pérez.
February 2002.
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