|
Editorial
Kate
Green MP writes in the Winter 2010/11 edition of the Fabian
Review:
In
Labour's current policy review, I'll be arguing that universal
benefits have an important role to play at every stage
of the life course. Reinstating universal child benefit
at the same rate for every child, and supporting the creation
of a universal pension - based on participation, not just
financial contribution - should form the bedrock of our
approach. And more universalism should be accompanied
by a more progressive tax system, building on the 50p
top tax rate.
We
welcome the fact that in the Labour Party there is now open
debate about the future direction of tax and benefits policy.
We
particularly welcome the fact that a policy suggestion from
the Government doesn't generate an automatic objection from
the Opposition. Steven Webb, as Minister of State for Pensions,
has proposed a universal pension. It is a pleasure to see
the idea espoused by a Labour member of the Work and Pensions
Select Committee. We are also of course pleased to see Kate
Green calling for Child Benefit to remain universal. This
is currently not Government policy, but we hope that
it soon will be again.
What
we now require is open debate, both in the Coalition Government
and in the Labour Party, of reforms to follow the establishment
of the Universal Credit. To individualise the Universal
Credit would individualise and simplify the whole tax and
benefits system. To remove the taper, at the same time as
turning Income Tax allowances into cash payments, would
give us a Citizen's Income, and the administrative simplicity
and employment incentives which would be the result.
News:
Pro-BI book becomes best-seller in Germany.
by Conall
Boyle
1000
Euro for everyone. Freedom. Equality. Basic Income is
the title of a new book (€1.000 für Jeden:
Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen in the original)
by Götz W. Werner and Adrienne Goehler, published in
August 2010. According to the Amazon.de website it is currently
in place No. 1,563 of all books being sold, but in the category
'Social Justice' it is No. 1. It is clearly of considerable
significance to find so much interest in a Citizen's Income
in a European country.
An
interesting review of this book appears in the January Review
of Books in Sp!ked. The first half of the review
is factual and informative and is reproduced below (with
permission from Sp!ked. You can read the original dated
Friday 28 January 2011 at www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/10136/
)
The
idea that the state should give everyone a basic income
has seized the imagination of Germany's middle class and
politicians.
by
Johannes Richardt (head of PR and communications at Novo
Argumente publishing house)
At
the moment, more than €1 trillion flows into the more
or less state-controlled German welfare complex every year.
Representing one third of German GDP, this vast amount of
money covers every social benefit, from child allowance
to health insurance. If the economic stats were not striking
enough, of the 80 million people living in Germany only
40 per cent earn a wage. So a large proportion of the population
is dependent either partially or wholly upon the state.
But
the German welfare state does not just provide a financial
safety net. It also seeks to regulate the behaviour of benefits
claimants through various forms of lifestyle intervention,
such as dictating how much claimants should be allowed to
spend on cigarettes. In this regard, the so-called Hartz
IV legislation, passed in 2005 by the then ruling Green-Social
Democrat coalition, is important. Named after its originator,
Peter Hartz - then a social democratic trade unionist and
manager of part state-owned Volkswagen before being imprisoned
for embezzlement in 2007 - Hartz IV effectively revised
the status of the unemployed. They were no longer citizens
in need of assistance while out of work: they were deemed
welfare dependent. They were no longer people fallen on
hard times, but fully capable of getting back into work:
they were psychologically dependent upon welfare and incapable
of getting back into work.
Hartz
IV not only produced a new form of state dependency; it
also sought to prepare these damaged citizens for work.
To this end, a new sector of senseless and unproductive
labour for about 1.5 million of the unemployed benefits
claimants was created (thus removing them from unemployment
statistics). Under the pretext of empowering the unemployed
by psychologically preparing them for the labour market,
these benefits claimants are forced into absurd and degrading
activities run by highly subsidised companies with Orwellian-sounding
names like Neue Arbeit [New Work]. One example of
this absurd work-for-work's-sake philosophy is the Toys
Company. In more than 60 factories around Germany, the formerly
unemployed people work for an extra €1 per hour on
top of their out-of-work benefits, recycling second-hand
toys for poor children. One task is to check the completeness
of second-hand puzzles. 'The record for completing the 5000-piece
puzzle is just 10 days', explained Toys Company's manager,
'although unfortunately we found out that three pieces were
missing'. Götz Werner and Adrienne Goehler refer to
this example in their new book 1000 € für Jeden.
Freiheit. Gleichheit. Grundeinkommen. (€1000 Each.
Liberty. Equality. Basic Income.) They argue for a new model
of state welfare distribution which would replace the bureaucratic,
behaviour-management regime of Hartz IV with one based on
a simple premise: the state would pay everyone a basic income.
At
first sight their central idea of a basic income for everybody
seems quite charming: Every citizen gets €1,000 from
the state every month from cradle to grave. As Werner, the
billionaire founder of a drugstore chain, and Goehler, president
of the Hamburg Art Academy, note, €1000 represents
more than just a living wage. They argue that it also enables
people to participate in the cultural life of society.
Because
this would be an amount that every person would be legally
entitled to, there would be no more degrading means tests
and interventions in the lives of benefits claimants. The
welfare bureaucracy as Germans know it would be redundant:
the unemployed would be freed from doing compulsory labour
promoted by the state, and the rest of society would be
freed from the imperative of wage labour provided by the
market. Income would be separated from work. As one would
not need to sell one's labour in order to guarantee an income,
the authors argue, people could choose their line of work,
for whom they want to work and for how long. This would
lead to a new society in which self-realisation, creativity
and compassion replace the existential fears created by
the current rat race.
The
German political class is partially sympathetic to the idea
of a basic income. Hence, with the exception of the Social
Democratic Party (plus trade unions), all parties represented
in parliament have been discussing various models of basic
income at some point in the past few years. For instance,
in its party programme, the liberal Free Democratic Party
calls for a Bürgergeld (Citizen's Income), an
amount paid out whenever necessary but low enough to maintain
the incentive to work. Elsewhere, the Greens call for a
Bedarfsorientiere Grundsicherung (needs-based basic
provision), and even within the conservative Christian Democrat
Party there is support for a Solidiarisches Bürgergeld
(solidarity citizen's income).
Support for the idea [also] comes from the German middle
class. Campaign groups with names like 'Freedom Instead
of Full Employment' and 'Federal Agency of Income' have
emerged, advertising their ideas on various websites, in
films and at events and demonstrations. It is important
to note that support for a basic income does not come from
unemployed and poorly educated low-wage employees. It comes
from privileged and educated young professionals with middle-class
backgrounds who, working in poorly-paid, insecure positions
in the media and cultural sector, hope for an unconditional
basic income to make their lives that little bit more secure.
This is no struggle for abundance for all. For these metropolitan
types, a basic income promises security, opportunities for
self-realisation and psychological well-being.
It
is to the fears and prejudices of this post-material milieu
that the book €1000 Each speaks. In this way,
the book exemplifies the rampant social pessimism so prominent
in contemporary Western societies. The authors describe
the insecure working conditions of the 'creative class',
surviving on short-term contracts and project work, as the
future for a society that has given up on the goal of well-paid
and meaningful work for everyone. According to the authors,
only a minority of people will earn their money in secure,
long-term work. The rest of us will be left to the fate
currently endured by the creative class, the 'vanguard of
precarious conditions'.
Referring
to American sociologist Jeremy Rifkin's 1995 book The
End of Work, Werner and Goehler argue that the advance
of globalisation, automation and rationalisation has led
to a post-industrial society in which production can no
longer serve as the basis of societal wealth. Economic growth,
they assert, 'is a dead duck'. Instead, Werner and Goehler
urge us to focus on creativity as 'the only remaining, sustainably
exploitable resource of the twenty-first century'. This
is why they argue for a basic income. Because to tap into
this resource of creativity, while avoiding the social unrest
that will come with the shortage of constant, paid work,
requires everyone to be accorded a level of material security.
This
is where the first half of the review ends. The second
half of the review is highly critical of the whole idea
of a Citizen's Income: 'Basic income, low aspiration: The
idea that the state should give everyone a basic income
has seized the imagination of Germany's middle class and
politicians. Their enthusiasm is testament only to the poverty
of their ambition' is the full title of the review. In the
next issue of the Citizen's Income Newsletter these
anti-CI views will be reproduced and critically examined.
Other
news item
The
Institute for Fiscal Studies has published Universal
Credit: A Preliminary Analysis. Their researchers write:
'Our empirical analysis in Sections 4 and 5 illustrates
well the constraints all governments face when contemplating
radical welfare reform. Universal Credit will strengthen
financial work incentives for some, as intended, but weaken
them for others. In general, incentives to work will be
strengthened for the main earner in a family who works part-time
or has low earnings, and will be weakened for those with
higher earnings and for second earners in couples. Marginal
effective tax rates will tend to fall for those on lower
earnings, and rise for those on higher earnings, although
this pattern also depends on how many earners there are
in the family. The reform will also lead to both winners
and, in the long run, losers. Because of the way the parameters
of Universal Credit have been set, couples, and particularly
those with children, look set to gain by more, on average,
than single-adult families, particularly lone parents, who
will lose on average according to our analysis. But, in
general, the impact on incomes is progressive, with the
bottom income deciles gaining the most as a fraction of
income.' (pp.67-8) (www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn116.pdf)
The
Institute for Fiscal Studies has reported research
on the National Minimum Wage (NMW) undertaken by a team
at Royal Holloway College in the University of London. They
find that 'the NMW is associated with a significant fall
in wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution',
and that in those areas where the NMW has had the largest
effect on wage levels, declines in wage inequality are steeper
than elsewhere. 'While the overall effect of the NMW on
employment rates averaged over its existence is neutral,
[they] do find small positive employment effects from 2003
onwards. Likewise, the association of the NMW with unemployment
has been negative in recent years. NMW effects on hours
have been mixed, but overall there is no compelling evidence
to indicate that the NMW upratings have had an adverse effect
on full-time total hours of work
The areas where
the NMW bit most have experienced larger falls in unemployment,
particularly in the latter half of the sample period', (Peter
Dolton, Chiara Rosazza Bondibene and Jonathan Wadsworth,
'The UK National Minimum Wage in Retrospect', Fiscal
Studies, vol.31, no.4, pp.510-532).
Obituary
Kevin
Donnelly, who was an active supporter of Basic (Citizen's)
Income from its early days in the 1980s, has died at his
home in Manchester aged 82. In an article by Kevin in the
BIRG Bulletin in 1989 he described himself as 'currently
supply teaching, writing articles and leaflets, after a
career as high-school dropout, toolmaker, clerk, sales manager,
then teacher'.
Kevin
was passionate about doing something to better the lives
of ordinary working men and women. He expressed this through
his religious belief, as well as actively promoting a Citizen's
Income in any arena available to him. In 1989 he was a founder
trustee of the Basic Income Research Group, which became
the Citizen's Income Trust in 1994.
The
standard definition of a Citizen's Income is that it should
be paid for by levying tax on the incomes of workers. It
was unease with this aspect of Basic or Citizen's Income
that led Kevin (and me) to become involved in monetary reform.
If the state reclaimed the money-creating power from commercial
banks, then the proceeds could be used to fund a small Basic
Income. Monetary reform used to be the preserve of cranks
(and sometimes bigots as well), but it has now become urgent
and mainstream following the banking crash of 2008. An important
forum for the monetary reform debate is the Christian Council
for Monetary Justice, of which Kevin was a long term supporter.
Kevin,
always inspirational, argued with infectious good humour.
His great joy was in pricking the pomposities of the hide-bound
and conventional. His do-it-yourself Christmas cards with
their poems and pictures were a delight. Game to the end,
his wife Shirley tells me he had several recently delivered
books yet to read.
Conall
Boyle
Main
article
The
International Labour Organisation's analysis of social transfers
worldwide augurs well for a Citizen's Income in the context
of middle and low-income countries 1
by
Ian Orton 2
Introduction
To
support its campaign on the global extension of social security,
in 2008 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) undertook
a study of 126 research reports on tax-financed social transfer
programmes (STs) operating worldwide. 62 programmes from
30 developing countries were analysed. These STs reach between
300 and 350 million beneficiaries - children, working adults,
and elderly people - and represent a considerable proportion
of the world's poor. The results are available through the
ILO's online Matrix on the effects of social transfers
(2009). 3 STs have emerged as a core
component of poverty reduction strategies supported by international
organisations such as the World Bank and a number of UN
institutions. Thus their impact merits considerable interest.
This
article outlines the current knowledge on the effects of
STs in a way relevant to those interested in Citizen's Income
(CI). STs are not unlike CIs. They are non-contributory
and tax-financed, and a considerable number of STs are unconditional
and universal (across certain groups). The ILO study shows
positive impacts of STs on a range of areas of human existence.
The study therefore enables us to predict the kinds of effects
that a CI could deliver in low and middle income countries.
The
findings of the ILO matrix on social transfers
The
ILO's matrix was developed to support decision-making within
ministries of planning and finance, mainly in developing
countries. By ordering the unintended and intended effects
of tax-financed STs in developing countries in relation
to human development goals and the anti-poverty agenda,
the matrix helps to inform national policy makers about
the outcomes that could be realistically expected from STs
and to guide investment in social security systems. Likewise,
all those interested in CI might utilise the findings of
the matrix to guide their arguments on the CI proposal.
Results
The
table below gives an overview of the impacts of the STs.
In the columns, the impact of STs in the specific sub-dimensions
are documented. Programmes had a generally positive effect,
4 evidenced by the significantly higher
scores in the 'clear positive effect' column for all but
five of the sub-dimensions. Those sub-dimensions where the
overall positive impact cannot be discerned are in grey
text.
The
conclusion of this article is that a majority of the social
transfers studied clearly generate a range of positive effects
in terms of enhancing human development, supporting the
full utilisation of productive capacity, enhancing and stabilising
consumption, and facilitating social cohesion and inclusion.
TABLE:
Summary of the ILO matrix: Effect of social transfers
| Impact
dimension and sub-dimensions |
Number
of programmes |
Total |
| with
a clear positive effect |
with
a clear negative effect |
with
no evidence of effect |
where
effect is unclear |
| 1.
Enhancing human development |
|
|
|
|
|
Adult
preventative health
Child labour
Child preventative health
Drop out rates
Educational attainment
Maternal preventative health
Reduction in the worst forms of
child labour
School attendance
School enrolment
|
1
6
7
4
9
3
1
12
13
|
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
|
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
|
1
2
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
|
2
10
7
5
10
3
1
12
13 |
| 2.
Supporting the full utilisation of productive capacity |
|
|
|
|
|
Employability
Employment creation
Reduction of informality
Participation in the labour market
Productive activities
|
1
4
-
5
15
|
-
-
1
2
-
|
1
1
-
-
-
|
2
2
-
2
-
|
4
7
1
9
15 |
| 3.
Enhancing and stabilising consumption |
|
|
|
|
|
Food
expenditure
Income inequality
Income level and stimulation of consumption
Income stability and consumption smoothing
Long-term effects on income and consumption
Nutritional level
Satiation
|
4
4
20
5
5
10
3
|
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
|
-
2
1
-
1
2
-
|
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
|
4
6
24
5
6
12
3
|
| 4.
Facilitating social cohesion and inclusion |
|
|
|
|
|
Empowerment
Intra-household relations
Social capital and solidarity
|
14
4
4
|
-
-
3
|
1
-
-
|
2
1
-
|
17
5
7 |
This
study shows that STs exhibit positive impacts on poverty,
health and nutrition, the social status of recipients (notably
women), economic activity and entrepreneurial small scale
investments (notably in agriculture), and have avoided significant
adverse effects on labour market participation of the poor
populations which they serve. The studies also show that
many families used part of the cash transfer to invest in
small-scale agricultural activities, including the purchase
of livestock. However, in the areas of adult preventative
health, reduction in the worst forms of child labour, employability,
reduction of labour market informality, and social capital
and solidarity, the effect of STs is less obvious, either
because there is no actual effect or because of limited
research on the subject.
In
light of these results, we can deduce that a CI could deliver
similar effects in some instances. Consequently, the results
can be used to support some aspects of the CI proposal.
However, before the repercussions for a CI are discussed
in detail, we need to explore a number of important caveats
and knowledge gaps.
Methodological
caveats and knowledge gaps
- The
programme evaluations covered by this study do not represent
an exhaustive list. Rather, the study covers those programmes
that were easily accessible online and were Anglophone
and to a lesser extent in Portuguese.
- There
are problems in finding original sources online. In light
of this, the study cannot be considered to be comprehensive,
though the studies used are probably representative and
give a good overview.
- The
findings in the table are the result of a subjective chain
of interpretation open to human error.
- The
matrix suffers from knowledge gaps. For example, little
is known about the effects of STs on non-beneficiaries,
and little is known about the macroeconomic impact of
STs on economic growth and about how this affects general
redistributive mechanisms (formal and informal).
- The
evaluations privilege quantitative measures over qualitative
ones. This is a concern because the qualitative effects
of STs (i.e. social bonds, capabilities, and human empowerment)
may have a lot more to say about people's well-being than
quantitative measures.
The
analysis presented here can therefore only be considered
as indicative of the effects of STs.
To
what extent does the ILO study support the Citizen's Income
proposal?
Thus
far this article has cautiously suggested that the findings
in the ILO matrix study augur well for CI, by indicating
that it too can be expected to deliver a number of similarly
positive effects. However, the message perhaps ought to
be a little more mixed and nuanced, because the table better
supports unconditional and universal transfers for children
and the elderly (a CI for the young and the old) than for
working age adults. A significant number of the STs that
focus on active population groups are conditional and targeted
(based on behaviour and income/wealth) and therefore one
might suppose that their effects will be related to their
conditional and targeted mechanisms.
Conclusion
1: Effects of social transfers for children and elderly
support the case for a Citizen's Income:
The
findings on the effects of STs on children and pensions
suggest that a CI could have similarly positive effects.
It is possible to make this conclusion because a significant
number of the STs for these two vulnerable groups were unconditional
or universal across these groups and are therefore similar
to a CI. The social pensions evaluated were not based on
previous activity or earnings and are therefore essentially
a Citizen's Pension. Similarly, the South African Child
Support Grant, which is unconditional, has encouraged human
capital formation of the young and their future earnings
(Agüero et al, 2007, p. 19). We could expect a CI to
do the same for children. The results of social pensions
and a number of other unconditional transfers support the
expectation that a CI could generate similarly positive
social and micro-economic effects.
Conclusion
2: Effects of social transfers for the active population
deliver a mixed message for a Citizen's Income
Apart
from the pilot CI in Namibia, there are no studies on the
impact of a CI on active population groups, simply because,
with the exception of the Alaskan Permanent Fund, there
is no fully-fledged CI that actually covers active population
groups. 5 Secondly, the STs analysed
in the ILO study differ from a CI because they are conditional.
6 It is therefore difficult to maintain
with any certainty that the effect of a CI would be the
same as for conditional and targeted STs.
Having
said that, the findings of the Namibian pilot scheme do
permit us an insight into how the active population group
might react. For instance, according to the evaluation of
this pilot, productive capacity of the active population
group rose and economic activity rose, especially among
women. In addition, own account work saw the largest increase,
and particularly the tending of vegetable plots and the
building of latrines, both of which increased the community's
health. The pilot scheme also seemed to stimulate more micro-economic
activity, with new shops opening. These findings are important
as they provide evidence that a CI does not act as a disincentive
in the labour market (see Basic Income Grant Coalition,
2009; Torry, 2009). This is of great significance, as the
argument that a CI would act as a disincentive to productive
activity tends to be one of the biggest concerns of policy
makers and governments with regard to STs for the active
population. Having said this, one must also be cautious
about using the Namibian pilot scheme as absolutely conclusive
evidence on the potential effect of a CI on the active population
because of obvious limitations in terms of replicating an
actual fully-fledged society-wide CI.
The
key impediment to using the table to support CI revolves
around whether it is the conditional nature of many of the
STs that is pivotal in producing the positive results they
have delivered. Does conditionality make the difference?
If conditionality is not the overriding factor, then
perhaps we can conclude that the unconditional and universal
nature of a CI could deliver results similar to those documented
in the ILO matrix. There is not space here to discuss this
debate in full, but suffice to say that the precise role
played by conditionality in delivering positive outcomes
is not clear. As the author of this article and the ILO
have argued elsewhere, it is problematic to argue that conditionality
is pivotal in producing the outcomes generated by STs (see
ILO, 2010a).
A
similarly ambivalent conclusion on the role of conditionality
is made by Gabel and Kamerman, who state that researchers
have not been able to attribute with absolute certainty
the causality between effect and the conditional mechanism,
because of the difficulty in disentangling the effects of
the policy from other elements (e.g., the state of the labour
market) (2008, p.18). One suspects that the motivation for
conditionality is to satisfy the 'paternalist twitch' of
governments and policy makers (Standing, 2002: 208) and
public thirst for satisfying the social ethic of reciprocity.
There is therefore plenty of scope for arguing that a CI
could deliver similar outcomes in the absence of conditionalities.
Closing
remarks
It
is not clear that conditionality is crucial in achieving
certain human development goals or for producing the positive
effects that have been identified in the ILO matrix, so
the study can be used to support a CI, provided caveats
and limitations accompany any such argument.
What
the findings of the matrix definitely support are those
conditional programmes which many see as precursors to a
society-wide CI. For example: in Brazil, Senator Eduardo
Suplicy, a key proponent of CI, has argued that the Bolsa
Familia ST is a first step towards a CI (2006). This
is because the behavioural demands synonymous with the receipt
of cash from conditional STs are easier to sell to the public
and political class than is a CI. The greater political
acceptability synonymous with conditional 7
STs could help to cultivate a political and public culture
more receptive to STs and, therefore, to a CI at a later
stage.
Just
as significant as the results of the matrix study are those
of the pilot CI in Namibia which has demonstrated positive
results similar to those documented in the ILO matrix table
across an entire community, including the active population.
Particularly significant are the positive effects on labour
market participation and productive capacity. The linking
of the matrix and the findings of the Namibian case study
can bridge the 'unknown' empirical dimension in the ILO
study; given that hitherto no society-wide CI has really
existed. Combining the results of the table and the Namibian
case study justifies the expectation that a CI could produce
similar effects to STs for the active population.
However,
the current preference amongst governments and major international
institutions (e.g. the World Bank) seems to be shifting
toward conditionality, and this poses some concerns for
those proposing universal and unconditional cash transfers.
The political prospects of a CI would be better if the trend
were against conditionality.
In
conclusion: The ILO matrix confirms what many have suspected,
that STs have a number of positive micro-economic and social
effects. The matrix also offers proponents of CI reasons
to feel optimistic that it too could produce similarly positive
results.
Disclaimer:
The author conducted the original research for this project
as a consultant for the International Labour Organization.
However, the responsibility for opinions expressed in this
paper rests solely with the author and dissemination does
not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour
Organization of the opinions expressed in it.
Notes
1. This paper was originally submitted at the 13th International
Congress of the Basic Income Earth Network in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, June 2010. I would like to thank Armando Barrientos,
Florence Bonnet, Philippe Marcadent, Nadine Ndeberi and
Luis Soares for their assistance, and the ILO's Social Security
Department for financing the original research that features
in this paper.
2.
The author currently works as the Financial Crisis Monitor
for the International Social Security Association.
3.
The author of this paper was a member of a team that carried
out the research that constituted the content of the ILO
matrix. The ILO matrix project was supervised by Philippe
Marcadent. The data contained in the matrix is discussed
more analytically in the new ILO book: Extending social
security for all: a guide through challenges and options
(2010a) and in an ILO working paper entitled: Effects
of non-contributory social transfers in developing countries:
A compendium (2010b).
4.
For a more detailed description of the methodology employed
to calculate the scoring system that features in the table
please see: Orton, I. 2010. Reason to be cheerful: How
ILO analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for
a basic income. www.bien2010brasil.com
5.
And this differs from the standard proposed version of a
CI in that it is an annual dividend, therefore one wonders
how far it can replicate the income smoothing nature of
those STs that are paid monthly.
6.
A similar discussion for the way many STs are targeted could
also be made, but there is not space here.
7.
The reason for this acceptability is that conditionality
conforms to the social norm of 'reciprocity' whereby in
social contract type relationship the recipient adjusts
his or her behaviour in a way acceptable to the rest of
society.
Bibliography
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J.; Carter, M.; Woolard, I. 2007. The impact of unconditional
cash transfers on nutrition: The South African Child Support
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Basic
Income Grant Coalition. 2009. Basic income grant pilot project
assessment report, April 2009. www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_Assessment_report_08b.pdf
Gabel,
S. & Kamerman, B. 2008. Do conditional cash transfers
work? The experience of the U.S. and developing countries.
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Politics, Institutions and Outcomes. www2.sofi.su.se/RC19/pdfpapers/Gatenio-Gabel_Kamerman_RC19_2008.pdf
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ILO.
2010a. Extending social security to all: A guide through
challenges and options. Geneva: ILO.
ILO.
2010b. Effects of non-contributory social transfers in
developing countries: A compendium. Geneva: ILO.
Orton,
I. 2010. Reasons to be cheerful: How ILO analysis of
social transfers worldwide augurs well for a basic income.
www.bien2010brasil.com
Standing,
G. 2002. Beyond the new paternalism: Basic security as
equality. London and New York, Verso.
Torry,
M., 2009. 'Can unconditional cash transfers work? They can',
Citizen's Income Newsletter, 2009/1, pp.1-3
www.citizensincome.org/resources/newsletter%20issue%202%202009.shtml#Namibia
Review
essay
Two
Memoirs Tell the History of the Alaska Dividend
Dave
Rose and Charles Wohlforth, Saving For the Future: My
Life and the Alaska Permanent Fund, Epicenter
Press, Kenmore, WA, 2008, 256pp, hbk, 978 0 9790470 4 6,
$24.95, pbk, 978 0 9790470 5 3, $17.95.
Jay
S. Hammond, Tales of Alaska's Bush Rat Governor,
Epicenter Press, Kenmore, WA, 1994, pbk, 340 pp, 978 0 945397
43 4, $17.95
Alaska's
Permanent Fund Dividend is closer to a Basic Income than
almost any other policy in the world today. The lessons
of how it was created and how it became so popular and successful
are extremely important to the Basic Income movement. Two
autobiographies available now tell different parts of the
story of the Alaska Dividend. One is by Jay Hammond, the
governor who, more than anyone else, is responsible for
creating the fund and dividend. The other is by Dave Rose,
the first executive director of the Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation.
Each
book tells the story of its author's life. These stories
are interesting in their own right, reflecting the experience
of many latter-day pioneers who came to Alaska from the
lower forty-eight states before or in the early years of
statehood. Hammond moved to Alaska after being a World War
II pilot, and he lived the Alaskan experience as a 'bush'
pilot, a wilderness guide, a homesteader, a legislator,
a small-town Borough President, and governor. Followers
of current U.S. politics will be interested to know that
Sarah Palin took the name of her television show from 'Jay
Hammond's Alaska,' which ran for seven years in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
But
followers of the Basic Income movement will be most interested
in the inside accounts of how the Alaska Dividend was created
and became the sound and solidly supported programme that
exists today. Although the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) is
the source of revenue for the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD),
many non-Alaskans are unaware that the two are different
programmemes created at different times by different kinds
of legislation.
The
events leading up to the creation of the fund began in 1955
when Alaska called a constitutional convention in advance
of statehood. The constitution that was finally adopted
proclaims that all of the natural resources of Alaska belong
to the state for the benefit of the people.
One
of the most important events which led to the development
of the fund and dividend happened quietly in an office in
Juneau in 1963. At that time, negotiations with the federal
government over which lands would be transferred to full
state ownership and which would remain federally owned had
dragged on for several years. A geologist named Tom Marshall
(according to Hammond) and/or the commissioner of natural
resources, Phil Holdsworth (according to Rose), persuaded
then-governor Bill Egan that there might be oil in far-northern
Alaska. Egan then finished the land negotiations with the
federal government by agreeing to take a 'large, barren
and unpopulated wasteland on Alaska's Arctic Slope, near
remote Prudhoe Bay.' In 1967, oil was discovered under that
barren, unpopulated wasteland.
Jay
Hammond was elected governor in 1974, when, he says, 'the
scent of anticipated oil revenues wafted like musk in the
halls of the state legislature'. Hammond was possessed with
the idea of putting as much of that money as possible into
a permanent fund that would pay dividends to Alaskans. The
concept had been with him for a long time. Years earlier,
as mayor of the small municipality of Bristol Bay Borough,
he had tried unsuccessfully to create a similar programme
at the local level using fisheries revenue.
Hammond
had many reasons for favouring the fund and dividend. He
thought that the temporary windfall should be saved rather
than spent as it came in. He was afraid that the government
would waste the windfall on poorly designed programmes or
projects that would benefit only special interests or favored
constituents. He wanted to make sure that every Alaskan
would benefit from their jointly owned oil resources. And
he hoped the dividend would help the poor.
After
reading his book and speaking to him at the 2005 USBIG Congress,
I still cannot say for sure how this idea came to Hammond
and how he came to be so obsessed by it. He appears to have
been influenced by the guaranteed income movement of the
1960s, but this does not fully explain where he got the
idea for a state-owned fund paying dividends to all citizens.
Although
Hammond was not the only person responsible for the creation
of the fund and dividend, it is clear that it would not
have happened without his single-minded pursuit of it for
his entire eight years as governor. He made it his top priority.
It was the object seemingly of every budget compromise he
made from 1974 to 1982. The Alaska Dividend therefore owes
its existence to the right person being in the right office
at the right time.
The
time was right not only because money was beginning to flow,
but also because of public perception. Five years before
he took office, in 1969, the state government had received
an initial windfall of $900 million (six times the size
of the state budget at that time) from the sale of leases
for the right to drill. Some people at the time, including
then-governor Keith Miller, argued that the state should
invest the money and spend only the interest. But by 1974
all of that money was gone, and there was a widespread (if
exaggerated) belief that most of it had been wasted. There
was thus strong support for saving at least part of the
expected oil windfall when Hammond began discussing the
idea of a fund and a dividend with the legislature.
In
1976, after a series of compromises, Alaskans passed an
amendment to the state constitution dedicating at least
25 percent of each year's oil royalties to the new APF.
It was a fraction of what Hammond wanted. Although he discussed
many different figures, he at one time had hopes of dedicating
50 percent of all oil revenue to the fund. Royalties
make up only about half of the state's oil revenues. Therefore,
the APF is only one-fourth as large has Hammond had wanted.
The
biggest missing piece, from Hammond's perspective, was the
dividend. There is no mention of it in the amendment, which
simply states that at least a minimum amount of certain
kinds of mineral revenue would go into a fund of 'income
producing investments.' It did not specify what these investments
should be or how the returns would be used. Although these
omissions were a disappointment to Hammond, according to
Rose, the vagueness of the APF amendment was instrumental
to its passage. It drew support from diverse groups, not
all of whom would have supported a more clearly defined
plan dedicating the returns to a dividend or anything else.
By
both Rose's and Hammond's accounts, the dividend proposal
was not popular with the public or with members of the legislature
when Hammond started pushing for it in the late 1970s. The
dividend got through thanks both to the strength of the
governor's office and to a long series of compromises made
by a few dedicated legislators.
After
a court challenge about how dividends were to be distributed,
the final version of the dividend bill was passed and went
into effect in 1982. It dedicated roughly half of the APF's
returns to the PFD. Unlike the fund itself, the dividend
is not protected by a constitutional amendment. It is created
by a simple majority vote of the state legislature. It is
protected today, mostly, by its enormous popularity. According
to Rose, a legislator proposed to do away with the PFD only
six months after the first dividends went out. Rose writes,
'His proposal had ample support in the Legislature, but
when the public heard about it, everyone ran for cover.'
After just one dividend cheque, the PFD had a strong political
constituency. After three or four cheques, it became politically
inviolable.
But
the fund was still not fully secure from diversion. The
principal only had to be held in 'income producing investments.'
There are many risky, politically motivated projects that
can count as income producing investments. Many politicians
wanted to use it for subsidized loans or infrastructure
projects. Some wanted to restrict the APF to invest only
in Alaskan assets. The legislature still has the power to
intervene on any of these issues, but for the most part
they have not. These issues have been resolved largely by
the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), a body that
was created in 1980 to manage the fund and dividend.
David
Rose became the first executive director of the APFC in
1982. He made it his goal to follow the 'prudent investor
rule,' a legal doctrine in which those who invest on behalf
of others must seek the highest returns consistent with
the safety of the investment. Investments with almost any
other political goal are ruled out by the prudent investor
rule, because they tend not to be the safest and most profitable.
This rule was nominally established in APF legislation in
1980, but the law has few teeth. It takes the self-discipline
of the managers and the oversight of public opinion to keep
it in place. The state set up other programmes for subsidized
loans and development projects. By the time Rose left office
in 1992, the prudent investor rule was well established
in precedent. The Alaskan public, wary that some bureaucrat
might be blowing the source of their future dividends, paid
close attention to the fund's performance.
Even
Rose felt the temptation to use the fund for political objectives.
He tells one story from the late 1980s when the manager
of Kuwait's sovereign wealth fund came to him privately
and suggested that the Kuwait fund, the APF, and two pension
funds from the lower forty-eight states, should pool their
assets and buy a controlling interest in British Petroleum
(BP). Rose turned it down, of course, but not without some
hesitation and daydreaming. It would have been a political
move - not the move of a prudent investor.
These
two books together lay out the long series of events between
1955 to 1992 that led to the APF being established in the
Alaskan state constitution; the PFD being established by
law; the prudent investor rule being established by law
and precedent; and all being protected by public opinion.
At the time of writing (January 2011), the APF is at more
than $38.4 billion. The most recent annual PFD (October
2010) was $1,281 for every man, woman, and child in Alaska.
The
dividend is safe for now because it continues to be one
of the most popular programmes in Alaska, but that might
not be true forever. The legislature has recently made several
attempts to redirect the principal of the fund toward political
projects, such as infrastructure investments, which show
reduced commitment to the prudent investor rule. Alaskans
were surprisingly resigned to the $12 billion the fund lost
in the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
Furthermore,
Alaska faces difficult budgetary times ahead thanks to decisions
made when the oil started flowing. Back then, when Hammond
was trying to create the dividend, he reluctantly and regretfully
signed a bill to eliminate the state income tax. Looking
at short-term effects only, the elimination of the income
tax seemed like a great idea. The state simply didn't need
the tax, and it was making far more money in oil revenue
than it needed to run the state budget. Hammond thought
it would be much better to dedicate more oil revenues to
the permanent fund and continue to finance most government
spending through regular taxes. Eliminating the income tax
would benefit Alaskans unevenly and temporarily. Dedicating
an equal amount of additional money to the APF (and an accompanying
dividend) would benefit all Alaskans permanently. Instead
the state decided to live off temporary oil revenue.
Today
nearly 85% of the Alaskan state budget is funded by oil.
When those revenues run out there will be enormous pressure
to redirect the PFD, and perhaps even APF principal, toward
supporting the state budget. Furthermore, the state will
be in the position of needing to find new tax sources just
when the industry that dominates the state economy will
be contracting. Perhaps natural gas will create a new resource
boom just as the oil money begins to run out. Perhaps some
other part of the Alaskan economy will take over. But it
is clear that Alaska is in a more precarious position than
it would have been if the state had saved more of its oil
revenues.
It's
tempting to think what might have been if Alaska had saved
all of its oil revenue in a best-case scenario. Suppose
the state had kept the income tax, put all its oil revenues
into the APF, and spent only the interest. The APF would
now be something in the neighborhood of eight-to-ten times
its actual current size of $38.4 billion. For a best-case
scenario, say $400 billion. Most financial analysts agree
that one can withdraw up to 4% or 5% per year from an investment
fund and still expect it to grow over time in real terms.
Suppose the state was able to withdraw 5% each year, using
half of it for dividends and half for the state's operating
budget. That would produce a dividend of $15,000 per person
per year and $10 billion for the state budget. Current total
state spending is only $10.5 billion per year. Thus, the
state would only need to raise $0.5 billion from other sources
this year, and it would be able to envisage the day when
returns to the fund financed the entire state budget.
Enticing,
but it is a best-case scenario, relying on the most optimistic
assumptions on every issue. It ignores all of the financial
risks and political, economic, and demographic barriers
to maintaining such a system. It also ignores the fact that
the state needed to spend some of the oil money as soon
as it came in. It was a poor state with weak infrastructure
and poor schools: it no longer is - thanks to the oil boom.
Although some of the oil money was wasted, some of it was
well spent. As Rose argues, 'Until basic needs are met,
such as education and public safety, the government has
no business saving for the future.' Alaska had to spend
a lot to meet its needs at the time, but it could have saved
much more than it has. If Hammond had got his way, the fund
and dividend would be four times the size they are now.
The
APF and PFD give us a model on which we can improve. The
memoirs of Hammond and Rose help us to understand how we
can do it.
Karl
Widerquist, Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University,
Doha, Qatar
Reviews
Ruth Lister, Understanding Theories
and Concepts in Social Policy, Policy Press,
2010, xii + 311 pp, hbk 1 861 34794 7, £60, pbk 1
861 34793 0, £19.99.
Not
only is this a most useful textbook, but it is also a sustained
argument for the usefulness of theory. The back cover says
that the book is for students and their teachers, but because
it constantly draws connections between social science theory
and practical social policy it will also be read with profit
by social policy practitioners.
Most
of the book's chapters start with a set of theories or ideologies
and then relate them to policy areas. Thus moral hazard
and public choice theory inform our understanding of Thatcherism's
quasi-markets; feminism has changed the position of the
public-private divide and thus our treatment of domestic
violence; post-Fordism has contributed to the change from
comprehensive education to niche-marketing academies; Foucault
has uncovered the disciplinary networks which now influence
many areas of our lives; and the idea of 'social construction'
tells us where 'the underclass' comes from - to mention
just a few of the many connections to be found in the book.
Three
important chapters then start with social policy concepts
- needs, citizenship, community, liberty, equality, and
social justice; and these too are related to practical social
issues: mental health, the relationship between social security
claimants and the state, and press censorship - again, to
name just a few.
The
structure and method of the book reflects the author's experience
with the Child Poverty Action Group and as a university
teacher, and the clarity of expression and organisation
of the material have clearly benefited from her teaching
experience. The final chapter on social movements similarly
reflects Lister's constant engagement with social policy
issues through her involvement in organisations, through
her speaking at conferences, and through her articles and
books. This chapter would have benefited from a rather more
personal approach and perhaps should have included an account
of issues she faced while at the Child Poverty Action Group.
In general, the last few chapters would have benefited from
more practical examples.
This
is a marvellously comprehensive and comprehensible textbook.
There is bound to be a second edition. It should contain
a chapter on future directions in social policy which outlines
the options for reform of the welfare state, and in particular
extends the material on the argument between universalism
and means-testing briefly begun on p.191. The debate over
the feasibility and desirability of universal provision
will be increasingly important in an age of austerity, and
students and practitioners would benefit from an extended
treatment of the field.
BIEN-Suisse,
Le financement d'un revenu de base inconditionnel,
Seismo, 2010, 204 pp, pbk, 2 88351 049 4, 38 SFr
We
normally only review books in English, but with this edited
collection we make an exception, not because it contains
translations from our own publications, but because it is
a sustained argument for the necessity and feasibility of
a Citizen's Income.
Peter
Ulrich's preface suggests that if Switzerland is to experience
a society of citizens then it needs more equal incomes and
more permeable social class boundaries. Increasing automation
and the demands of sustainability will between them mean
that not everyone will be employed full-time, so a Citizen's
Income will be needed to provide for the necessary more
equal incomes and to enable everyone to be employed part-time.
Ulrich recommends that 25% of Swiss GDP (the same proportion
as is spent on income maintenance in Switzerland today)
should be spent on providing every Swiss citizen with a
Citizen's Income of 1,500 SFr Citizen's Income. Higher taxes
would make a Citizen's Income of 2,500 SFr per month possible.
Bridget
Dommen-Meade's introduction to the book summarises the chapters
and links their discussions into an argument for a Swiss
Citizen's Income's feasibility. Then come three chapters
arguing for the feasibility of a Citizen's Income in Switzerland:
Bernard Kundig's insightful study of long-term changes in
the economy and in Swiss society leads into an argument
for a Citizen's Income funded by an increase in consumption
taxes and flat income tax; Albert Jörriman suggests
a mechanism which would result in the employed giving back
an amount equal to the Citizen's Income, and he suggests
how provision for unemployment and disability might relate
to a Citizen's Income; and both Kundig and Jörriman
suggest that a Citizen's Income of 2,500 SFr per month should
be feasible. [This is approximately £1,500 per month
or £18,000 per annum]; and Jörriman argues that
a Citizen's Income of this level would not discourage paid
employment and would encourage self-employment and co-operatives
(p.81). Daniel Hani and Enno Schmidt argue for the same
level of Citizen's Income and also argue for funding by
an increase in consumption taxation, and emphasise the additional
labour market choices in which a Citizen's Income would
result.
The
next few chapters are translations of published material
about other countries. Marc de Basquiat argues for the feasibility
of a Citizen's Income of €12.60 per day in France;
Ingmar Kumpmann and Ingrid Hohenleitner suggest a phased
implementation of a Citizen's Income in Germany, so that
the effects on national income can be evaluated; and Pieter
le Roux argues for a Citizen's Income of R100 (about £10)
per week per adult. He shows that even though a consumption
tax increase considered by itself would be more regressive
than an income tax increase, when considered alongside the
establishment of a Citizen's Income it would be progressive.
The other two chapters are a translation of Anne Miller's
article on minimum income standards in the third issue of
the Citizen's Income Newsletter for 2009 and the
Citizen's Income Trust's introductory booklet.
The
chapters which advocate consumption taxes as a method of
financing a Citizen's Income give pause for thought to those
of us in the UK who have for so long assumed that reduction
of income tax allowances and possibly adjustment of income
tax rates would be the best method. Also of interest are
discussions about the labour market effects of a Citizen's
Income. If a partial Citizen's Income is likely to provide
greater employment market incentives than a full Citizen's
Income then it should be possible to find an optimum level
of Citizen's Income, though probably only from practical
experience of different levels. As Dommen-Meade suggests,
the long-term effects of a Citizen's Income are more important
than the short-term ones. She thinks the Swiss welfare system
ripe for major change, and that a Citizen's Income is the
way to do it. 'We are convinced
' (p.27).
Perhaps
the most significant finding is that in every European country
studied a partial Citizen's Income is found to be feasible.
This raises again the question as to whether a pan-European
partial Citizen's Income might be possible. Not only would
this offer all of the benefits which a Citizen's Income
in each country would offer, but it would also promote the
efficiency of the European labour market, to the benefit
of every European economy. The discussions of funding in
the book suggest that such a pan-European Citizen's Income
should be funded by a European consumption tax collected
nationally.
Such
a Citizen's Income would probably require Switzerland to
join the EU: but that's another discussion.
Vladimir
Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide,
Policy Press, 2010, x + 126 pp, hbk 1 847 42643, £60,
pbk 1 847 426406, £19.99
This
book is the fruit of a lifetime of academic research and
administrative experience in international social security
policy. Rys worked for thirty years for the International
Social Security Association (ISSA) and for half of that
time as its General Secretary, and there can be few people
with such a broad geographical and historical overview of
the evolution of social security (here understood as financial
benefits and also state insurance-funded health provision)
and of the challenges facing it.
The
first part of the book offers an international history of
social security, a discussion of the economic and ideological
context of the current debate, and some current trends:
'
a series of shifts in emphasis on different elements in
the existing structures and different roles assigned to
specific actors. Thus, the state, while reducing its direct
involvement in running social security schemes and providing
social welfare benefits, is at the same time greatly increasing
its powers when it comes to regulating occupational or
private arrangements. Simultaneously,
there is
an obvious shift of responsibility back to employers and
different forms of occupational welfare, back to families
and their supporting role, and also back to the individual
and their personal capacity to save for rainy days' (p.55)
The
second part of the book builds on Rys's previous publications
on the sociological study of social security policy, and
in particular discusses the ISSA's contribution to the development
of a method which goes 'beyond the descriptive accounts
of the institution as contained in legislative texts and
[explains] why it is organised the way it is and why it
functions the way it does' (p.77). Such a method contributes
to policy debate by suggesting which proposals might be
feasible and which not. The different components of the
method are discussed: the demographic, the economic, the
sociological, and the political, the study of ideas, ideologies,
laws, institutions and administrative techniques, and the
study of the ways in which ideas are disseminated. The method
is then applied to a variety of contexts, and particularly
to eastern Europe ( - Rys is Czech).
The
third section of the book is entitled 'Reinventing social
security in time of economic crisis: foundations of a new
political consensus' and argues for transparency about expenditures
and present and future benefit levels and that only a renewed
emphasis on social insurance can halt the privatisation
of social security:
'The
principle of social insurance appeals partly to the rational
self-interest of the individual, assuring them of access
to benefits not normally attainable through private means,
but also partly to their natural sentiment of solidarity
and respect for other human beings' (p.116)
As
Rys suggests in his introduction, 'it would be irresponsible,
in the light of recent experience, to entrust [social insurance]
to private arrangements' (p.2).
Whilst
rather too much of this book is of the 'We did this at the
ISSA' variety, there is plenty of useful material here,
and, above all, a sustained and rational argument for the
importance of social insurance. However, Rys's own career
investment in the development of today's systems leads him
to neglect developments in which he has been rather less
involved. It simply isn't true that 'no new social protection
mechanism has been invented to deal with new risks and socially
precarious situations' (p.1). 'Basic income', 'citizen's
income' and 'Child Benefit' don't appear in the index, and
neither do 'universal' or 'universalism'. Recent experience
in Namibia suggests that universal provision might be precisely
the new mechanism which the current crisis needs.
Bernd
Marin and Eszter Zólyomi (eds), Women's Work and
Pensions: What is Good, What is Best? Designing Gender-Sensitive
Arrangements, Ashgate, 2010, 321 pp, pbk 1 4094
0698 3, £35
The
chapters of this book started life at a conference organised
by the European Centre in Vienna, and it is therefore unsurprising
that they contain more about Austria than about any other
individual country; but there is still plenty of diversity,
and the single country and comparative studies of recent
changes in pensions provision contain material on a variety
of European countries, including the UK.
Trends
identified include: increasing female participation in the
labour market, continuing gender-specific employment and
caring patterns, population ageing, a transition from defined
benefit to defined contribution schemes, increasing numbers
of years of earnings being taken into account when pension
levels in defined benefit schemes are calculated, and progressive
equalisation between women and men of the age at which state
retirement pensions become payable. The questions asked
could be summed up by 'Can we create gender-specific and
nevertheless fair rules for women and men alike within overall
gender-neutral institutional frameworks?' (p.18)
Annika
Sundén, in a chapter on retirement income security,
recognises that what is good for women in the long term
(e.g., longer formal labour market participation) might
not be good for them in the short term - and vice versa
(e.g., means-tested benefits, which can be of benefit in
the short term, but which create labour market disincentives
and thus be detrimental in the longer term). Fornero and
Monticone identify the risks inherent in the recent transition
from women being largely dependent on men's accrued pension
rights to their increasingly individualised pension entitlements.
Ashgar Zaidi et al discuss the surprising fact that the
poverty risk for older women is 'higher in EU15 [the first
fifteen European Member States] (23%) than in the new Member
States (18%)' (p.99), and finds that 'flat rate universal
minimum benefits have been
most effective in improving
women's pension incomes' (p.103). Readers of this Newsletter
will be particularly interested in the Dutch residence-based
universal state pension discussed in this chapter, especially
now that Professor Steven Webb, Minister of State for Pensions,
has proposed that the UK should implement a Citizen's Pension.
Of
special interest in the chapters on single country and comparative
studies is Gould's conclusion that partial disability benefits
can contribute to labour market participation and thus to
income in retirement. Marin's chapter suggests that 'women
are much less women than men are men - and women are much
more different among themselves than they are different
from men' (p.223), meaning that creating the right mix of
pension provision is going to be a complex business. The
overall message to emerge from this book is that pension
provision is generally a highly complex matter, but that
lessons can be learnt by studying both the structures and
the detail of different countries' systems, and in particular
the effects of those systems on women's incomes in retirement.
Some
of the chapters and a comprehensive annex are packed full
of voluminous data: a treasure trove for students, teachers
and researchers. (It's a pity that there is no index, that
the chapters aren't numbered, and that the proofreading
is far from perfect.)
Books
such as this can sometimes suffer from a lack of coverage
of the subject because each of the authors writes about
their own very specific speciality. In the case of this
book the highly detailed discussion of specific situations
enables broad trends to be identified and broad conclusions
to be drawn, making it a most useful volume.
Viewpoint
Where
does housing fit in?
by
Jake Eliot
Looking
at progress against the pillars of the Beveridge welfare
state: health, housing and education, many commentators
have identified housing as the 'wobbly pillar', starved
of investment or ineffectively maintained. The forthcoming
UK Housing Review will show that the past two years
has seen the highest sustained investment in social housing
in the last three decades. 1 However,
with 4.5m on housing registers and affordability ratios
extending beyond the average there is a clear and pressing
need for change.
The
Hills Review into the future of social housing (2007) underlined
that while there is a wide range of ways of supporting better
housing provision, Britain has traditionally focused on
three ways of providing housing support: the provision of
social housing at affordable, sub-market rents; means-tested
Housing Benefit; and tax benefits for owner-occupiers. 2
The
proportion of total welfare bill taken up by housing has
increased considerably over recent years, and reform has
been slow. The coalition government entered power with a
commitment to reducing the welfare bill. The Emergency Budget
of June 2010, the Spending Review, and consultation on the
creation of the Universal Credit, have ushered in a dramatic
and wide scale reform of Housing Benefit. This is an appropriate
time for those interested in a Citizen's Income to consider
these changes and to ask where housing best fits with a
Citizen's Income.
Housing
Benefit
Housing
Benefit (HB) is means-tested and directly supports people's
real housing costs. As such it is already targeted at those
most in need. Housing Benefit is available to those in work
and to those out of work, and so it should, if effective,
form an important part of a range of incentives and nudges
to move off other out-of-work benefits and into employment.
Of
the 4.7m households that claim Housing Benefit, 76% are
retired or not expected to work due to illness, disability,
or caring commitments. The remaining 24% of claimants are
of working age and expected to work, with 540,000 (50%)
in employment. It is estimated that around half of employed
households who would be eligible for Housing Benefit do
not claim. 3
Debates
over the reform of Housing Benefit are many and varied.
However, it is feasible to summarise two broad issues of
interest to supporters of a Citizen's Income:
- Increasing
costs to the public purse, because of pressure in the
UK housing market and concerns that a system that allows
for payment of up to 100% of unregulated private market
rents creates an incentive for landlords to maximise rental
return from HB claimants and a lack of incentives for
HB claimants in the private sector to seek suitable accommodation
and lower rents. The Government's analysis is that, without
reform, expenditure is expected to rise to £24bn
by 2014/15. 4
- The
high taper rate of HB contributes to the poverty trap
and means that recipients have few incentives to find
work. Housing Benefit has a taper rate of 65% which is
applied to income above the applicable amount. The Housing
Benefit and Council Tax benefit taper rates are additive,
so the marginal deduction rate faced by a claimant in
receipt of both Housing Benefit and Council Tax benefit
is 85%, so net incomes rise in very small proportion to
gross earnings. In his report on the future of social
housing, John Hills used the example of a couple with
two children, paying a rent of £120 per week. In
this case, the household would gain only £23 a week
from an increase in earnings from £100 to £400
per week. 5
Reforms
in the last two decades, like the introduction of Choice
Based Lettings for social housing, and the creation of the
Local Housing Allowance for those receiving Housing Benefit
in the private sector, have put a greater emphasis on Housing
Benefit as a system which encourages and supports its recipients
to make more active choices from the options that they face.
Since
the budget in June 2010, the coalition Government has announced
a number of significant reforms to Housing Benefit:
- Local
Housing Allowance rates will be set at the 30th percentile
of rents in each Broad Rental Market Area rather than
the median rate, meaning that tenants will only be able
to claim rent for the cheapest 30% of properties in the
local area.
- Extending
to 35 the age below which single people can only claim
HB for a room in a shared house. Currently the single
room rate is limited to people 25 and under.
- Increases
in non-dependents' deductions over a three year period
from April 2011.
- Tenants
who have claimed JSA for more than one year will lose
10% of their HB entitlement from April 2013.
- Government
intends to limit claims of HB of working age people to
the size of accommodation they are deemed to need. More
detail on this is expected in the coming year.
- Housing
Benefit will be reduced by the Government's proposed total
benefits cap, projected to be £26,000 per year (£500
per week) by 2013.
Housing
and the Universal Credit
Unifying
current benefits for working and non-working households
to create a single Universal Credit will help to simplify
the system, but, critically, the focus of the Universal
Credit is to improve the incentive to work by making work
pay through creating a single integrated taper which will
withdraw support more gradually as earnings rise. As the
analysis of the white paper in the last Citizen's Income
Newsletter made clear, the Universal Credit will provide
a simplified structure designed to cover a range of needs.
The credit will be an integrated working age welfare payment
for a basic personal living allowance with additional elements
for households with children, people with disabilities or
caring responsibilities, and housing costs. As well as replacing
Income Support and Income Related Employment Support Allowance,
and Working and Child Tax Credits, it will also include
Housing Benefit.
The
White Paper states that an appropriate amount will be added
to the Universal Credit to meet the cost of rent or mortgage
interest. A number of supporters of greater simplification
and streamlining of benefits may view this as a fudged compromise,
but this addition is potentially an important commitment
to retain a link between benefits and the actual rent charged
to individuals.
A
system that does not take into account the real costs of
housing could leave existing tenants unable to keep up rent
payments and leave social housing providers unable to build
new homes. To date, a reliable income stream of Housing
Benefits has allowed independent housing associations to
secure long-term loan finance at reasonable rates that has
enabled them to build affordable, social, supported and
specialist homes that neither the market nor local authorities
have been able build.
The
actual impact of the Universal Credit on housing will only
become clear as details are agreed. However, as the Universal
Credit will assist mortgage interest costs as well as rents,
it will help the welfare system to be more tenure neutral.
However, individuals and families getting help with housing
costs will have their earnings disregard reduced by a multiple
of 1.5 times the eligible costs, down to the floor of minimum
earning disregards for those with higher levels of housing
costs. This will mean that the higher the household's housing
costs the less positive the financial incentives of the
scheme.
The
proposals for the Universal Credit are focused on people
of working age and the upper limit for the Universal Credit
will be the age of eligibility for Pension Credit. However,
the Government is planning to change Pension Credit to provide
support for rents and to add a further element to provide
income-related support for pensioners with dependent children.
Housing
Benefit and the Citizens Income
Due
to the inefficiencies and structural problems within the
UK housing market, dedicated support with housing to meet
the real costs of rents and mortgages is needed. There are
a number of possible responses that a CI might make to the
Housing Benefit debate, which may be worthy of further exploration.
To get the conversation started, here are three deliberately
simplistic responses which in practice are not mutually
exclusive:
- Leave
it alone: Housing remains outside the CI as a payment
to households rather than individuals.
- Bring
it together: Look at the opportunities of a CI alongside
a Universal Credit which would include a simplified, tenure
neutral approach to housing costs. The interaction of
a Universal Credit with a CI could offer a radical simplification
of housing support making the system transparent, accountable
and simpler to run. This approach would lead us to look
at policy approaches and delivery mechanisms that will
help support this in an era where central government is
keen to see more localised leadership and reduced costs,
such as authorities grouping together to provide streamlined
and shared benefits services.
- Look
wider: Rather than asking a technical question about how
approaches to specific benefits might sit together, supporters
of a CI could ask what we need a housing policy to do
in order to help deliver the CI's outcomes: redistribution
of income, poverty reduction, clearer incentives to work
and participate in society, and greater choice, control
and autonomy for citizens in the housing market. This
might focus on policies to improve the supply of social
housing and ways to deliver more mixed communities through
a variety of low cost home ownership options, as well
as looking at the role of the private rented sector and
asking what regulation and approach might be required.
Notes
1.
http://www.cih.org/publications/downloads/ukhr.htm
2. Hills, John (2007) Ends and means: the future roles
of social housing in England. Centre for Analysis of
Social Exclusion, London School of Economics and Political
Science, London, UK
3.
National Housing Federation, Responsible Choices for
a Fairer Future, July 2010.
4. The Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions, Speech to Institute for Public Policy
Research, Tuesday 7 December 2010
5.
Hills, John (2007) Ends and means: the future roles of
social housing in England. Centre for Analysis of Social
Exclusion, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London, UK
©
Citizen's Income Trust, 2011
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